Sometimes it begins in a conference room, a cultural association, a “Russian House,” a school, an organization of “compatriots,” a religious structure linked to Moscow, a media outlet, a Franco-Russian “friendship” circle, or an event that appears completely harmless. This is precisely how an effective influence strategy works: it first presents itself under a civilian, cultural, educational, or associative appearance. The Kremlin knows how to use culture, history, religion, diasporas, media, and certain associative networks as instruments of presence, legitimization, and influence.
Attached to this publication is a document listing nearly 300 locations and organizations in France, with addresses, telephone numbers, and various publicly available details: Russian “cultural” houses, schools, associations, Franco-Russian “friendship” circles, community, religious, or cultural structures. This list obviously does not mean that every one of these organizations is an intelligence cover or is involved in illegal activity. It must be understood as a mapping of ecosystems that deserve scrutiny, while carefully distinguishing entirely legitimate activities from structures that are genuinely linked to, financed by, directed by, or instrumentalized by bodies of the Russian state.
Some of these environments can become relays for propaganda, disinformation, and ideological subversion, echo chambers in which the same narratives circulate repeatedly until they begin to look like spontaneous public opinion. Russia is supposedly surrounded, NATO allegedly provoked the war, no one supposedly knows the real truth, Ukraine and Russia are presented as equally responsible, sanctions are described as nothing more than “Russophobia,” and every attempt at counter-interference is portrayed as an attack on Russian culture. This is how influence operations work: they do not necessarily need to turn you into a supporter of Moscow. Sometimes it is enough to make you skeptical, confused, exhausted, passive, or unable to clearly distinguish the aggressor from the victim.
Russian hybrid warfare operates as a complete ecosystem: propaganda, disinformation, political influence, historical manipulation, cyber operations, sabotage, intimidation, recruitment of intermediaries, intelligence collection, economic pressure, social networks, associative structures, and ideological subversion can all reinforce one another. Its effectiveness relies precisely on our tendency to look at each of these elements separately when they should be analyzed as different components of the same architecture.
That is why counter-interference work must not remain the exclusive responsibility of specialized services. At their own level, every citizen can contribute to the resilience of their country, but this must be done lawfully and intelligently: verify information before sharing it, identify manipulative narratives, document facts that are publicly accessible, report genuinely suspicious behavior to the competent authorities, support journalists and researchers working on foreign interference, and refuse to become an echo chamber for propaganda.
This is not about intimidating people, harassing associations, following individuals, or conducting private surveillance operations. That would be dangerous, counterproductive, and sometimes illegal. Public observation, analysis, documentation, legitimate questioning, and reporting verifiable facts to the authorities: yes. Replacing intelligence services or turning citizens into vigilantes: no. A democracy defends itself precisely by remaining more rigorous than those who seek to destabilize it.
Because one fundamental reality must be understood: you may feel that France is not at war with Russia. You may see this confrontation as distant, limited to Ukraine, or reserved for governments and armed forces. Yet the Russian state has for years conducted operations against European societies involving influence, disinformation, cyberattacks, interference, and destabilization. Not considering yourself to be in a hybrid war does not mean that the adversary considers you neutral.
What is ultimately being targeted is not only a government or a military alliance. It is collective trust, national cohesion, the ability to distinguish truth from falsehood, institutions, democratic values, history, language, culture, and freedom of thought. An authoritarian power does not necessarily need to physically conquer every territory in order to win strategically. Sometimes it only needs to convince a society that it is no longer worth defending, that all of its institutions are corrupt, that truth no longer exists, and that resistance is pointless.
That is why the strongest response is collective resilience. Ask questions. Examine funding. Review institutional links. Identify leaders and intermediaries. Study partnerships. Understand which narratives are being disseminated. Map connections with official Russian organizations. Document publicly what can legitimately be documented. Forward to the competent services what requires investigation. And above all, never allow disinformation to turn our own anger into behavior that would ultimately serve the adversary’s propaganda.
This is not about fighting Russian culture. It is about preventing the Russian state from turning culture into an instrument of influence. It is not about fighting the Orthodox faith. It is about preventing the Kremlin from turning religion into a geopolitical lever. It is not about placing an entire population under suspicion. It is about mapping, documenting, understanding, and countering the structures that genuinely serve the interests of a hostile power.
A hybrid war is not won by soldiers, police officers, or intelligence services alone.
It is won when the state, the armed forces, the security services, civil society, researchers, journalists, and citizens understand that they are defending the same informational and democratic space.
The state, the armed forces, and the people — together against interference, manipulation, and subversion.
CEAS — Making the invisible war visible.